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 Can We Please Stop Doing This ? 
By the Way, Postema was Right 
 DENNIS  PATTERSON  *  
 I. Introduction 
 While legal philosophy has its own unique set of questions and problems, one 
activity it shares with many other areas of philosophy is the urge to fi nd the 
essence of  ‘ law ’ . Whether expressed as  ‘ essence ’ ,  ‘ necessary and suffi cient ’ or  ‘ nature ’ , 
the enterprise is fi nding the features of law that set it apart from other normative 
phenomena. 
 Many philosophers have abandoned the search for the essential features of 
many things. The conventional wisdom now seems to be (roughly) that the world 
divides into natural kinds and other (social or artefactual) kinds. 
 Legal philosophers have not given up the search for the essence of law. In 
this way, they are rather different from philosophers in many other areas of the 
discipline. 
 In this chapter, I will consider three attempts to identify the essence or nature 
of law. I will argue that each attempt fails for different reasons. If these attempts 
to identify the essence of law fail, what are we to make of these failures ? Are they 
simply three different failed attempts or do they indicate something more ? 
 I will then consider Gerald Postema ’ s effort to point to a different way of 
thinking about law and what legal philosophers ought to be doing when we do 
jurisprudence. Postema ’ s work is a model of how to do legal theory: it is meth-
odologically sophisticated and it solves problems not otherwise amenable to 
resolution. 
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 1  See Raz (1994: 210 – 11). 
 2  See Perry (2001). 
 3  See Raz (2006: 1005 – 6, 1008, 1010 – 11). 
 4  See Searle (1995: 31 – 52). 
 II. Joseph Raz 
 Raz ’ s account of authority is an essential feature of his view of the nature of law. 
He maintains that the law necessarily claims to be a genuine and not merely de 
facto authority. For law to fulfi l the mediating role that it claims for itself, on Raz ’ s 
view, the law must issue dictates that can be readily understood and acted upon. 
More specifi cally, people need to be able to grasp legal norms (ie identify those 
norms as valid) independently of their identifi cation and consideration of the 
(dependent) reasons for those norms. It is for this reason that Raz ’ s position can 
be characterised as exclusive legal positivism. Exclusive legal positivists insist that 
the content of law must come from social sources alone. Raz articulates the sources 
thesis as follows:  ‘ All law is source-based  … A law is source-based if its existence 
and content can be identifi ed by reference to social facts alone, without resort to 
any evaluative argument ’ . 1 Although some read him as making a moral argument, 2 
I think it more accurate to read Raz as making a conceptual or metaphysical claim 
about the nature of law. In this regard, Raz himself has been somewhat equivocal 
on the matter, sometimes speaking of  ‘ the ’ concept of authority,  ‘ our ’ concept of 
authority, or  ‘ concept(s) of authority ’ . 3 
 The problem with Raz ’ s position is that he makes no arguments directly in 
 support of his claims for necessity. This is no small omission, for the success of 
Raz ’ s account of law ’ s authority depends upon the strength of his claim that the 
concept of law is special in that its meaning is not (solely) a function of linguistic 
usage and, further, that the content of the concept is (at least in part) dictated by 
something other than conventions for the use of the word. 
 I believe that Raz needs to answer the question of the nature of law with an 
account of concepts. To answer the question of the nature of law, we need to know 
what sort of concept law is. Once we have identifi ed what kind of concept law is, 
we can move toward answering what sort of conceptual analysis is necessary for 
a concept like law. In short, an account of concepts is a necessary preliminary to 
answering the question  ‘ What is the nature of law ? ’ 
 The conventional metaphysical wisdom is that concepts divide up into at least 
two categories: natural kind concepts and artefactual kinds. Natural kind concepts 
are those whose essence is dictated by a microstructural element, such as atomic 
formula or DNA. Artefactual kinds are products of human invention. These social 
constructs are the stuff of John Searle ’ s  ‘ Institutional Facts ’ : their existence depends 
upon our attitudes or intentions. 4 Where does Raz ’ s account of the nature of law 
fall into this divide ? It is not at all clear. 
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 5  See Raz (2005: 328). 
 6  ibid 331. 
 7  See Alexy (2008: 290). 
 On the one hand, Raz says this about the nature of law:  ‘ A theory consists of nec-
essary truths, for only necessary truths about the law reveal the nature of the law ’ . 5 
But Raz also maintains that  ‘ [i]n large measure what we study when we study the 
nature of law is the nature of our own self-understanding ’ . 6 It is diffi cult to see how 
necessary truths can arise out of the self-understanding of participants in a prac-
tice. Raz seems to want an account of the nature of law that identifi es necessary 
truths at the same time it identifi es something seemingly contingent about law 
(ie our self-understanding of it). Putting together necessity and contingency seems 
to me to be the next step in the development of exclusive legal positivism. Until 
Raz accomplishes this task, his claims for law ’ s authority are unconvincing. 
 III. Robert Alexy 
 Robert Alexy argues that the concept of law has  ‘ necessary ’ features. Alexy eschews 
talk of natural kinds, arguing instead for  ‘ necessary ’ features of law. Alexy is 
wholly unclear about what he means by  ‘ necessity ’ . For this reason, his claims 
 regarding law ’ s necessary features are unconvincing. Here is Professor Alexy ’ s own 
 description of his enterprise: 
 Enquiring into the nature of something is to enquire into its necessary properties. Thus, 
for the question  ‘ What is the nature of law ? ’ one may substitute the question  ‘ What are 
the necessary properties of law ? ’ Necessary properties that are specifi c to the law are 
essential properties of law. Essential or necessary properties of law are those properties 
without which law would not be law. They must be there, quite apart from space and 
time, wherever and whenever law exists. Thus, necessary or essential properties are at the 
same time universal characteristics of law. Legal philosophy  qua enquiry into the nature 
of law is, therefore, an enterprise universalistic in nature. 7 
 Every sentence in this paragraph raises more questions than it answers. Let us take 
them one at a time. 
 (1)  ‘ Enquiring into the nature of something is to enquire into its necessary 
properties. ’ This is merely defi nitional: identifying the nature of something is 
identifying what is essential to it. 
 (2)  ‘ Thus, for the question  “ What is the nature of law ? ” one may substitute the 
question  “ What are the necessary properties of law ? ” . ’ This seems to be the previ-
ous question but now with a focus on law. The nature of law is what is necessary 
to law. 
 (3)  ‘ Essential or necessary properties of law are those properties without which 
law would not be law. ’ This is just a restatement of the previous sentence. If there 
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 8  In the fi rst passage I quoted, Alexy appears to be distinguishing between (a) necessary  properties 
of law and (b) essential properties of law, namely essential properties are those necessary  properties 
that are specifi c (unique ? ) to law. In the current passage, he seems not to be distinguishing — or 
 perhaps just not emphasising in this passage — between the two. This could be characterised as a form 
of  Aristotelianism:  ‘ Man is necessarily an animal, but essentially a rational animal, because although 
animality and rationality are both necessary properties, rationality is a specifi c — unique — property of 
man ’ . My thanks to Hans Oberdiek for this point. 
 9  Grant that X is a necessary feature of law and Y is both a necessary and essential feature of law 
so that law has universal and necessary features: How does it follow that an enquiry into law is a 
 ‘ universalistic enterprise ’ ? Thanks again to Hans Oberdiek for this point. 
 10  See Alexy (2004: 163). 
 11  See Alexy (2008: 293). Alexy also draws a distinction between  ‘ practical ’ and  ‘ conceptual ’ 
 necessity:  ‘ Including coercion in the concept of law is adequate to its object, the law, because it mirrors 
were necessary properties to law then, by defi nition, law would not be law if it 
lacked those necessary properties. 8 
 (4)  ‘ They must be there, quite apart from space and time, wherever and 
 whenever law exists. ’ The previous sentence is extended with the assertion that 
the necessary features of law are  ‘ there ’ quite apart from space and time. But this 
is just a bald assertion. No argument has been provided and it certainly does not 
follow from the previous sentences, which were merely defi nitional or mere logical 
transformations. 
 (5)  ‘ Thus, necessary or essential properties are at the same time universal charac-
teristics of law. ’ The word  ‘ thus ’ implies that this sentence states a proposition that 
follows from the previous sentence or sentences. I fail to see how this is the case. 
 (6)  ‘ Legal philosophy qua enquiry into the nature of law is, therefore, an enter-
prise universalistic in nature. ’ This sentence is question-begging because we have 
no idea what a  ‘ universalistic enterprise ’ consists in. 9 It has something to do with 
enterprises and activities that are  ‘ necessary ’ but more detail is needed. 
 Alexy identifi es two features of law that he deems  ‘ essential ’ . These two features 
are what make law what it is. He writes: 
 Two properties are essential for law: coercion or force on the one hand, and correctness 
or rightness on the other. The fi rst concerns a central element of the social effi cacy of 
law, the second expresses its ideal or critical dimension. It is the central question of legal 
philosophy to ask how these two concepts are related to the concept of law and, through 
it, to each other. All — or at least nearly all — questions of legal philosophy depend on the 
answer to this question. 10 
 For Alexy, law has two necessary features, coercion and correctness/rightness. One 
question we might ask is whether Alexy uses the word  ‘ necessary ’ in the same way 
when he refers to both coercion and correctness. It seems he does not. Consider: 
 To include coercion in the concept of law is adequate to its object, the law, for it mirrors 
a practical necessity essentially connected with law. Coercion is necessary if law is to be a 
social practice that fulfi ls its basic formal purposes as defi ned by the values of legal cer-
tainty and effi ciency. This practical necessity is the reason why the conceptual  necessity 
implicit in the use of language is based not merely on a convention but also on the nature 
of the thing to which the concept refers. It is, in this sense, an absolute necessity. 11 
 53Can We Please Stop Doing This?
a  practical necessity necessarily connected with law. Coercion is necessary if law is to be a social practice 
that fulfi lls its basic formal functions as defi ned by the values of legal certainty and effi ciency as well 
as  possible. This practical necessity, which seems to correspond to a certain degree to Hart ’ s [1994, 
199]  ‘ natural necessity ’  … is mirrored in a conceptual necessity implicit in the use of language. This 
shows that language, which we use to refer to social facts, is inspired by the hermeneutic  principle that 
each human practice is to be conceived of as an attempt to carry out its functions as well as  possible. 
 Unravelling this connection between conceptual and practical necessity makes clear in what sense 
 coercion belongs as a necessary property to the nature of law ’ (Alexy 2004: 163). 
 12  Alexy (2004: 162 – 63). 
 13  Think of Hart ’ s discussion of power-conferring rules in Hart ( 1994 ) . 
 14  For example, soft law,  lex mercatoria , ADR, the law of indigenous peoples and Internet law 
(eg ICANN and UDRP). 
 15  I would add that the claim to  ‘ universality ’ is undercut as well. 
 16  See Alexy (2004: 162 – 63). 
 In this passage, Alexy characterises coercion as a  ‘ practical necessity ’ of law. This 
contrasts with a far more rigorous form of necessity, which Alexy characterises 
thus: 
 The possibility of defi ning the concept of nature as it appears in sentences of the form 
 ‘ What is the nature of  φ ? , ’ namely, by means of the concept of necessity, allows for the 
substitution of the question  ‘ What is the nature of law ? ’ by the question  ‘ What are the 
necessary properties of law ? ’ This question leads, by means of the concept of necessity 
(and its relatives, analyticity, and the a priori), to the specifi c character of law. The ques-
tion of what is necessary turns, when connected with the question of what is specifi c, into 
the question of what is essential. This is the area of the specifi c character thesis. 12 
 It seems that coercion is  ‘ practically necessary ’ to law but not necessarily con-
ceptually necessary. If this understanding of Alexy ’ s position is correct, two points 
are salient. First, the claim that coercion is a necessary feature of law has been the 
subject of widespread commentary and is, to say the least, problematic. 13 There 
are all sorts of normative practices that are recognised as  ‘ law ’ but which lack the 
coercive aspects of municipal law. 14 For example, the claim that international law 
is not  ‘ really law ’ because of the lack of coercive enforcement has been severely 
criticised. I will not rehearse the arguments here. I will only say that the claim is 
hotly contested. 
 The second point is that if Alexy is claiming that coercion is a  ‘ practically 
 necessary ’ feature of law, then his claim is far softer than the use of the word 
 ‘ necessity ’ implies. As he himself says, his claim for coercion is  ‘ teleological ’ and 
not, it seems, conceptual. In short, Alexy seems to say that without coercion, law 
would not be effi cacious. This is not a conceptual but a practical claim. Whatever 
its merits, the claim will be sustained at the level of facts and not in the nature 
of concepts. 15 Alexy ’ s claims for the dual nature thesis are far stronger and do, as 
he himself says, implicate deep philosophical issues (Alexy mentions analyticity 
and the a priori). 16 It is here that Alexy substantially raises the stakes for his deep 
philosophical claims about the nature of law. Before turning to Alexy ’ s arguments 
in detail, a little stage setting is in order. 
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 17  This discussion of Quine has benefi tted from Hanna and Harrison (2004: 270 – 74).  For an 
 excellent introduction to the issues, with a wide-ranging tour of the history of the debates, see Juhl 
and Loomis ( 2010 ) . 
 18  This discussion is taken from Rey ( 2008 ) . 
 Alexy wants to show that the claim to correctness is part of the very idea of  ‘ law ’ . 
That is, he wants to show that it is analytically true that the claim to  correctness 
is a constitutive feature of law. To do this, he has to show that the distinction 
between analytic and synthetic statements can be maintained. It was precisely 
this claim that Quine put in question. Quine argued that the diffi culty with 
 analyticity was  demonstrating any principled difference between analyticity and 
 co-extensionality. 17 Consider the predicates  ‘ creature with kidneys ’ and  ‘ creature 
with a heart ’ . These two predicates are true of the same objects (ie people, animals, 
etc). Compare this with  ‘ bachelor ’ and  ‘ unmarried man ’ . These two predicates are 
true of exactly the same objects (ie some men). We intuitively think the differ-
ence between these two cases is a matter of contingency in the fi rst (ie a  ‘ trick 
of nature ’ ) and  ‘ necessity ’ in the second. So what explains the difference ? This is 
where Quine ’ s criticism bites. 
 We intuitively want to say that  ‘ bachelor ’ and  ‘ unmarried man ’ are equivalent in 
meaning, that is, that they are synonyms. But what do we mean when we say that 
two terms are synonymous ? We mean they are interchangeable  salva veritate . But 
this will not work because it embroils the notion of synonymy with the very neces-
sity it was meant to explain! Without a prior account of the notion of analyticity, 
there is no hope of making sense of the distinction between co-extensionality and 
synonymy. 
 Let us consider Quine ’ s point by comparing sentences. Consider the following 
two sets of sentences: 
 Set I 
(1)  Some doctors who specialise in eyes are ill-humoured. 
(2)  Some ophthalmologists are ill-humoured. 
(3)  Many bachelors are ophthalmologists. 
(4)  People who run damage their bodies. 
(5)  If Holmes killed Sikes, then Watson must be dead. 
 Set II 
(1)  All doctors who specialise in eyes are doctors. 
(2)  All ophthalmologists are doctors. 
(3)  All bachelors are unmarried. 
(4)  People who run move their bodies. 
(5)  If Holmes killed Sikes, then Sikes is dead. 18 
 Most people, indeed almost all, would see real differences between the sentences in 
Sets I and II. The sentences in Set I are claims that may or may not be true. To know 
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 19  See Quine and Ullian (1978). 
 20  On Kant ’ s account, geometry is unrevisable in virtue of being synthetic a priori. Quine also 
pointed out that many unrevisable beliefs do not seem analytic (eg  ‘ The earth has existed for more 
than fi ve years ’ and  ‘ Some people have eyes ’ ). See Quine (1960); Rey (2008). 
whether these sentences are true, one would need to investigate the  underlying 
facts. The same cannot be said of the sentences in Set II. These sentences seem to 
state truths that are  ‘ true ’ but in a different sense than the sentences in Set I. The 
sentences in Set II are true in the sense that a denial of any one of them would, 
in some sense, be unintelligible. Philosophers say that the sentences in Set I are 
 ‘ synthetic ’ and those in Set II  ‘ analytic ’ . It is this distinction that Quine disputes. 
 There is little doubt of the felt sense of truth in the sentences in Set II. How 
could one deny that all ophthalmologists are doctors ? An ophthalmologist is a 
 ‘ doctor for the eyes ’ . Here Quine and Ullian introduced the metaphor of a  ‘ web of 
belief  ’ to illustrate this sense of inevitability and truth. 19 They argued that the only 
reason we regard sentences like those in Set II as  ‘ analytic ’ or  ‘ true independently 
of reality ’ is that such sentences express thoughts or beliefs that are central to our 
world view. This centrality in no way makes such beliefs unrevisable. On the con-
trary, just as Kant mistakenly thought about geometry, even our most cherished 
beliefs can be revised in the face of recalcitrant evidence. 20 
 How does Quine ’ s work connect with Alexy ’ s claims about the nature of law ? 
Alexy wants to use the power of necessity, analyticity and the a priori to under-
write his claims about the nature of law. That is all well and good. But he owes us 
a complete account of what he means by  ‘ necessity ’ . He has yet to provide one. Not 
only that, he needs to provide an account that at least addresses Quine ’ s criticisms. 
Doing so is, pardon the pun, necessary for his project. 
 IV. Ronald Dworkin 
 I will argue that Dworkin ’ s incorporation of natural kinds semantics into his 
 jurisprudence is problematic for three reasons. First, I attack the fundamental 
premise of Dworkin ’ s argument; to wit, the claim that the meaning of natural 
kind terms such as  ‘ gold ’ ,  ‘ tiger ’ , and  ‘ water ’ is a function of the deep structure 
of the things to which these terms refer. Proponents of natural kinds make two 
claims. Metaphysically, natural kinds are identical with their underlying natures. 
Semantically, natural kinds are directly referential; that is, the meaning of natural 
kind terms is a function of direct reference cashed out in terms of microstructure. 
I grant, arguendo, the metaphysical thesis but deny the semantic thesis. In short, 
my claim is that there is no necessary relationship between natural kinds and the 
meaning of natural kind terms. If this argument is successful, then the premise 
from which Dworkin ’ s argument proceeds necessarily fails. 
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 21  I am mindful that Dworkin says that there are  ‘ instructive similarities ’ (Dworkin 2004: 12) 
to be drawn between natural kind concepts like  ‘ water ’ ,  ‘ tiger ’ and  ‘ gold ’ and political concepts like 
 ‘ democracy ’ ,  ‘ liberty ’ and  ‘ equality ’ . It is diffi cult to discern just how far Dworkin intends to take this 
comparison. Michael Green has recently argued that Dworkin commits a  ‘ fallacy ’ (Green dubs it 
 ‘ Dworkin ’ s Fallacy ’ ) by grounding an interpretive theory of law in an interpretive theory of mean-
ing. See Green (2003: 1909 – 10). Dworkin describes Green ’ s account of his argument as a  ‘ surprising 
misreading ’ , see Dworkin (2006: 226). Additionally, Dworkin states that legal concepts are  ‘ interpretive 
concepts ’ and not natural kind concepts. ( ‘ I explicitly rejected a natural kind interpretation of any of 
the concepts of law ’ (ibid 227). One is left to wonder just what Dworkin means when he states there are 
 ‘ instructive similarities ’ to be drawn between legal and natural kind concepts. The essence of natural 
kind concepts is necessity, specifi cally metaphysical necessity; see eg Kripke (1980). If legal and natural 
kind concepts are not similar in terms of metaphysical necessity, it is rather unclear in just what sense 
Dworkin thinks they are  ‘ similar ’ . 
 22  I owe this way of making the point to John Oberdiek. 
 23  See Postema (1987: 283). 
 My second argument grants, arguendo, the premise that there are natural kinds. 
But Dworkin ’ s argument for hidden essences for political and legal kinds fails 
because, unlike science, in matters of value there is no agreed way to adjudicate 
disputes over the existence and features of such essences. Without epistemic or 
methodological confi rmation, debates about the  ‘ real ’ meaning of political and 
legal concepts will not be resolved by appeals to  ‘ the hidden nature of things ’ . 
 My fi nal argument also grants, arguendo, that there are natural kinds. But if 
Dworkin is to be taken at his word about similarities between natural kind and 
legal concepts, 21 then there is a material — indeed, signifi cant — shift in his  general 
jurisprudential position. If legal and political concepts are best understood as akin 
to natural kinds, then judges should ignore precedents whenever those  precedents 
fail to refl ect the judge ’ s sense of the (natural kind) meaning of the term in 
 question. In Dworkin ’ s terminology, the  ‘ fi t ’ side of the fi t/justifi cation picture of 
adjudication becomes superfl uous. In short, adjudication would be  ‘ justifi cation 
all the way down ’ . 22 
 V. Gerald Postema 
 Gerald Postema ’ s article  ‘ Protestant Interpretation and Social Practices ’ 23 is the 
single best work devoted to the mature thought of Ronald Dworkin. The reason it 
is the best is simply stated: unlike all other commentators, Postema uncovers the 
deep philosophical presuppositions of Dworkin ’ s approach and shows why they 
are implausible. In addition, and in the course of making his critical points about 
Dworkin, Postema articulates an approach to jurisprudence that is singularly clear 
and persuasive. It is this aspect of the article that marks it as a major contribution 
to legal theory. 
 Postema ’ s central contention is that law is an intersubjective practice. When 
you remove the intersubjective element, you lose the explanatory power needed to 
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 24  ibid 284. 
 25  ibid. 
 26  This is how I understand Dworkin ’ s reference to  ‘ raw behaviorial data ’ at Dworkin (1986: 52) and 
in personal conversation with him. I believe he is committed to this view of the  ‘ data ’ by his  assumption, 
central to his account of the possibility of controversy in social practices, that the  ‘ data ’ are common, 
but the interpretations or theories of them are not. See below. 
understand law. Before we get to Postema ’ s account of how best to understand law, 
let me review his treatment of Dworkin. 
 Law is an interpretive concept. The best way to understand the practice of law 
is as an exercise in constructive interpretation. As for the nature of law, Dworkin 
argues: 
 (1) that his theory fi ts legal practice as we know it at least as well as (or better than) 
other viable general interpretations, and (2) that it commands our allegiance because 
it portrays the law as serving a fundamental political ideal to which we are properly 
 committed, namely, integrity. 24 
 In sum,  ‘ Dworkin ’ s philosophical account of law  … is built on two fundamental 
notions: interpretation and integrity ’ . 25 
 As he says in the article, Postema focuses on Dworkin ’ s core idea of law as an 
exercise in (constructive) interpretation. The problem is with the  ‘ protestant ’ 
dimension of Dworkin ’ s account. 
 For Dworkin, there are three stages of interpretation in law. Postema explains: 
 At the  preintepretative stage the interpreter collects the rules, standards, and descrip-
tions of characteristic behavior and activities of participants which are widely agreed 
among participants to be elements of the practice in question. This provides the  ‘ raw 
data ’ of the interpretive theory. Dworkin admits that this  ‘ data ’ is never, strictly speaking, 
 ‘ uninterpreted ’ , (LE, 66, 422) but, as we will see later, it must be  ‘ raw ’ or  ‘ uninterpreted ’ 
relative to the practice. That is, it is behavior (or rules) abstracted from its meaning in 
the practice. 26 
 At the  interpretative stage , the interpreter  ‘ proposes a value for the practice by describing 
a scheme of interests or goals or principles the practice can be taken to serve or express 
or exemplify ’ (LE 52). This interpretation must both fi t ( ‘ enough ’ of) the practice and 
show the practice to have normative appeal, i.e., it must provide a justifi cation of its main 
elements and of participation in it. This interpretation, at least in the ideal case to which 
actual interpretations approximate, will take the form of an abstract or general theory 
(LE 90), a systematically ordered set of explicitly articulated general purposes, aims, or 
principles from which the various more concrete elements of the practice can be seen to 
 ‘ follow ’ (in some suitably wide sense of  ‘ follow ’ ). 
 Finally, with this theory in hand, interpreters at the post-interpretive or  ‘ reforming ’ 
stage may adjust their views of the requirements of the practice so as better to serve the 
 justifi cation outlined in the theory. Note that, on this view, it is misleading to describe the 
activity at this stage as  ‘ changing the practice ’ . What the  ‘ reforming ’  interpreter regards as 
requirements of the practice may appear, from the pre-interpretive stage, to be substantial 
changes of (deviations from) accepted practice. But if the interpretative attitude has taken 
hold in a practice, consensus requirements collected at the  preinterpretive stage have no 
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 27  Postema (1987: 291 – 93). 
 28  Postema (1987: 287). See Dworkin (1986: 58). 
 29  Postema (1987: 287). 
 30  ibid 300. 
 31  ibid. 
 32  ibid. 
 33  ibid 301. 
 34  ibid. 
 35  ibid. 
fi nal authoritative status. They are, relative to the practice, as yet ( virtually)  uninterpreted, 
a collection of actions, decisions, and even rules in search of an  interpretation. Once 
the interpretive task is undertaken, views about what the practice requires may (and, 
when the practice is healthy, will) differ substantially. But these  differing views must, on 
 Dworkin ’ s view, be regarded not as proposals for changes in the practice, but as confl ict-
ing views about what the practice as presently constituted really is and what, as a result, 
it really requires of participants. In this respect, theory drives practice, for the practice 
is what the (best) general interpretive/justifi catory theory says it is: claims about what 
in concrete cases the practice requires, permits, or sanctions are true in virtue of their 
 following from the best such theory of the practice. 27 
 It is in his treatment of the third stage of interpretation that Dworkin sows the 
seeds for the failure of his position. In interpreting the practice, each partici-
pant  ‘ is trying to discover his own intention in maintaining and participating in 
that practice  … in the sense of fi nding a purposeful account of his behavior he 
is comfortable in ascribing to himself  ’ . 28 Postema notes that Dworkin  ‘ explicitly 
portrays social interpretation  “ as a conversation with oneself (LE 58) ” ’ . 29 While 
the object of interpretation is the same for every participant,  ‘ interpretations are 
private ’ . 30 Theory precedes practice. 31 And what is common in interpretations ? 
Postema answers:  ‘ That which appears common in the practice is merely the over-
lap of extensions of the (more or less explicit) interpretive theories of individual 
participants ’ . 32 
 The root of the problem with Dworkin ’ s theory of law lies in his approach to 
interpretation:  ‘ it makes interpretation of social practices insuffi ciently practical, 
insuffi ciently intersubjective, and thus (at least in the case of law) insuffi ciently 
political ’ . 33 In Dworkin ’ s hands, participants in law are reduced to  ‘ window-
less social monads ’ . 34 Thus, Postema challenges  ‘ Dworkin ’ s theory of law only 
 indirectly, by challenging the general theory of interpretation on which it rests ’ . 35 
 The interpretive attitude is rare. Although he does not put it this way, Postema 
rejects the Heidegger/Gadamer view that interpretation is a fundamental feature 
of everyday existence. Rather, Wittgenstein got it right: interpretation is a second-
order activity one engages in when understanding breaks down. Postema makes 
this point indirectly in this passage, citing Wittgenstein: 
 to understand a practice is fi rst of all to grasp  ‘ how to go on ’ , and that involves neither 
merely acquiring a repertoire of routine reactions to routine situations, nor grasping a 
general proposition (let alone a systematic theory) logically independent of the practice 
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 36  ibid 303 – 4. 
 37  ibid 305. 
 38  ibid 306. 
 39  ibid 308. 
 40  ibid. 
 41  ibid 308 ff. 
 42  ibid 309. 
 43  ibid. 
 44  ibid 310. 
 45  ibid 312 – 13. 
 46  ibid 313. 
 47  ibid. 
 48  ibid. 
activities. Rather, it involves learning a discipline or mastering a technique. It involves 
the capacity to relate different items in the world of the practice and to locate apparently 
new items in that world, to move around with a certain ease in the web of relationships 
created by it. This is interpretation, in the straightforward sense that it involves a sure 
grasp of the  ‘ meaning ’ of the various actions in the repertoire in question through their 
places in the practice, and a grasp of how the practice fi ts together, how it makes sense. 36 
 It is virtually impossible to fi nd a practice exemplifying Dworkin ’ s claim that the 
point or purpose of a practice can be stated independently of the rules and partic-
ulars of the practice. 37 Worse, even if we grant Dworkin ’ s claim, it is not clear that 
the object of competing interpretations can be identifi ed independently of any 
interpretation. 38 The real business of interpretation is  ‘ uncovering together the 
meaning of our common action ’ . 39 Interpretive activity is  ‘ essentially  interactive ’ . 40 
We now shift to Postema ’ s positive position. 
 Postema ’ s fi rst example is friendship. 41 When we  ‘ interpret ’ what friendship 
means, we do not focus on what our culture means by  ‘ friendship ’ . Rather, we 
give our attention to  ‘ what our friendship, our relationship, means or requires ’ . 42 
Sharing a friendship, Aristotle noted, is not like two cows sharing a fi eld. Rather, it 
engenders  ‘ common perception, a common perspective, and common discourse. 
Friendship is characterized  … not by sympathy or consensus ( homonoia ), but by 
common deliberation, and thought ’ . 43 The same interactive process is  exemplifi ed 
in the work of courts, lawyers and citizens. 44  ‘ Far from being  “ a conversation with 
oneself  ” , such interpretive activity is, when properly understood, essentially a 
 conversation with other participants. ’ 45 
 Postema ’ s conclusions: 
(1)  Understanding a practice is mastery of a discipline. 46 
(2)  To learn a social practice is to become acquainted through participation, 
wherein one comes to grasp the common meaning of the practice. 47 
(3)  The common world of the practice is not constructed out of individual 
 interpretations of it. Rather,  ‘ we have expectations of the behavior and 
expectations of others because we recognize that we participate in a  common 
world ’ . 48 
60 Dennis Patterson
 49  See Leiter (2009: 1215). 
 50  See Postema (1987: 318). 
 A fi nal and all-important point: confl ict (interpretation) presupposes  consensus. 
Although he does not put it this way, Postema ’ s point comes directly from 
 Wittgenstein. All interpretation (a second-order activity) presupposes under-
standing (how to go on in a practice). The need for interpretation is rare. 49 But 
when it arises, consensus is the background against which interpretation takes 
place. 
 Postema ’ s fi nal point: Dworkin is part of the very tradition he criticises. The 
unity of law does not depend on some structure. Rather, it involves a shared 
 capacity to move within a web of practice. 50 Postema was the fi rst person to make 
this point. He was right. But many in the analytic legal philosophy simply ignore 
the position and the arguments. 
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